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dc.contributor.authorGizatulina, Aliaen_US
dc.contributor.authorHellwig, Martinen_US
dc.description.abstractFor an incomplete-information model of public-good provision with interim participation constraints, we show that efficient outcomes can be approximated, with approximately full surplus extraction, when there are many agents and each agent is informationally small. The result holds even if agents' payoffs cannot be unambiguously inferred from their beliefs, i.e., even if the so-called BDP property (Beliefs Determine Preferences) of Neeman (2004) does not hold. The contrary result of Neeman (2004) rests on an implicit uniformity requirement that is incompatible with the notion that agents are informationally small because there are many other agents who have information about them.en_US
dc.publisherMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009,28en_US
dc.subject.keywordsurplus extractionen_US
dc.subject.keywordmechanism designen_US
dc.subject.keywordinformational smallnessen_US
dc.subject.keywordcorrelated informationen_US
dc.titleInformational smallness and the scope for limiting information rentsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

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