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dc.contributor.authorBurhop, Carstenen_US
dc.contributor.authorLübbers, Thorstenen_US
dc.description.abstractWe investigate a sample of 180 technology licensing contracts closed by German chemical, pharmaceutical, and electrical engineering companies between 1880 and 1913. A regression analysis shows that licensing contracts closed before a patent was granted and contracts closed between firms and individual inventors had a higher probability of including a profit-sharing clause. This supports Jensen and Thursby's (2001) model, who propose equity-sharing licensing contracts to solve moral hazard problems. Moreover, we show that milestones were a substitute for profit shares. Furthermore, exclusive licences offered a significantly higher profit share to the licensor.en_US
dc.publisherMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009,25en_US
dc.subject.keywordEconomic Historyen_US
dc.subject.keywordLicensing contractsen_US
dc.subject.keywordTechnology transferen_US
dc.titleThe historical market for technology licenses: chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and electrical engineering in imperial Germanyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

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