Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/32238 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods No. 2009,25
Verlag: 
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We investigate a sample of 180 technology licensing contracts closed by German chemical, pharmaceutical, and electrical engineering companies between 1880 and 1913. A regression analysis shows that licensing contracts closed before a patent was granted and contracts closed between firms and individual inventors had a higher probability of including a profit-sharing clause. This supports Jensen and Thursby's (2001) model, who propose equity-sharing licensing contracts to solve moral hazard problems. Moreover, we show that milestones were a substitute for profit shares. Furthermore, exclusive licences offered a significantly higher profit share to the licensor.
Schlagwörter: 
Economic History
Germany
pre-1913
Licensing contracts
Technology transfer
JEL: 
N83
O32
L14
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
631.88 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.