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dc.contributor.authorNicklisch, Andreasen_US
dc.contributor.authorWolff, Ireneusen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-01-27en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T12:02:07Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T12:02:07Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32237-
dc.description.abstractCarpenter and Matthews (2009) examine the cooperation norms determining people's punishment behavior in a social-dilemma game. Their findings are striking: absolute norms outperform the relative norms commonly regarded as the determinants of punishment. Using multiple punishment stages and self-contained episodes of interaction, we disentangle the effects of retaliation and norm-related punishment. An additional treatment provides data on the norms bystanders use in judging punishment actions. Our results partly confirm the findings of Carpenter and Matthews: only for the punishment-related decisions in the first iteration is the absolute norm outperformed by the self-referential norm set by the punisher's own contribution. For the decisions in all later iterations, as well as for bystanders' support in all iterations, the absolute norm organizes our data best. In contrast to the study by Carpenter and Matthews, we find an absolute norm of 3=4 of players' endowments to be both consistent across decisions and relatively stable over time.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009,40en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.jelD63en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordExperimenten_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic-gooden_US
dc.subject.keywordpunishmenten_US
dc.subject.keywordsocial normsen_US
dc.subject.keywordvoluntary cooperationen_US
dc.titleCooperation norms in multiple-stage punishmenten_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn617291950en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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