Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32235
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dc.contributor.authorHellwig, Martinen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-03en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T12:02:07Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T12:02:07Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32235-
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the design of optimal utilitarian mechanisms for an excludable public good. Excludability provides a basis for making people pay for admissions; the payments can be used for redistribution and/or funding. Whereas previous work assumed that admissions are governed by the payment or nonpayment of a price, this paper allows for arbitrary admission rules. With sufficient inequality aversion, nondegenerate randomization in admissions is shown to be desirable for certain model specifications, with and without participation constraints. The paper also gives a sufficient condition on the distribution of preferences under which randomization is undesirable.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2009,12en_US
dc.subject.jelD61en_US
dc.subject.jelD63en_US
dc.subject.jelH21en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordUtilitarian welfare maximizationen_US
dc.subject.keywordAdmission rules for excludable public goodsen_US
dc.subject.keywordRandomization in optimal mechanismsen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwGebühren_US
dc.subject.stwUtilitarismusen_US
dc.subject.stwMechanismen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleUtilitarian mechanism design for an excludable public gooden_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn605797285en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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