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dc.contributor.authorWeinschenk, Philippen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-03en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T12:02:06Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T12:02:06Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32234-
dc.description.abstractWe examine the persistence of monopolies in markets with innovations when the outcome of research is uncertain. We show that for low success probabilities of research, the incumbent can seldom preempt the potential entrant. Then the efficiency effect outweighs the replacement effect. It is vice versa for high probabilities. Moreover, the incumbent specializes in safe” research and the potential entrant in risky” research. We also show that the probability of entry has an inverted U-shape in the success probability. Since even at the peak entry is rather unlikely, the persistence of the monopoly is high.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009,11en_US
dc.subject.jelL12en_US
dc.subject.jelO31en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordPersistence of Monopolyen_US
dc.subject.keywordEfficiency Effecten_US
dc.subject.keywordReplacement Effecten_US
dc.subject.keywordStochastic Innovationsen_US
dc.subject.stwInnovationen_US
dc.subject.stwMonopolen_US
dc.subject.stwIndustrielle Forschungen_US
dc.subject.stwStochastischer Prozessen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsteilungen_US
dc.subject.stwMarkteintritten_US
dc.subject.stwInnovationswettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwPotenzieller Wettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titlePersistence of monopoly and research specializationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn605796777en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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