Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/32234 
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dc.contributor.authorWeinschenk, Philippen
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-03-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T12:02:06Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T12:02:06Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32234-
dc.description.abstractWe examine the persistence of monopolies in markets with innovations when the outcome of research is uncertain. We show that for low success probabilities of research, the incumbent can seldom preempt the potential entrant. Then the efficiency effect outweighs the replacement effect. It is vice versa for high probabilities. Moreover, the incumbent specializes in safe” research and the potential entrant in risky” research. We also show that the probability of entry has an inverted U-shape in the success probability. Since even at the peak entry is rather unlikely, the persistence of the monopoly is high.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2009,11en
dc.subject.jelL12en
dc.subject.jelO31en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordPersistence of Monopolyen
dc.subject.keywordEfficiency Effecten
dc.subject.keywordReplacement Effecten
dc.subject.keywordStochastic Innovationsen
dc.subject.stwInnovationen
dc.subject.stwMonopolen
dc.subject.stwIndustrielle Forschungen
dc.subject.stwStochastischer Prozessen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsteilungen
dc.subject.stwMarkteintritten
dc.subject.stwInnovationswettbewerben
dc.subject.stwPotenzieller Wettbewerben
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titlePersistence of monopoly and research specialization-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn605796777en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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