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dc.contributor.authorBierbrauer, Felixen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-31en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T12:02:05Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T12:02:05Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32231-
dc.description.abstractWe study a large economy model in which individuals have private information about their productive abilities and their preferences for public goods. A mechanism design approach is used to characterize implementable tax and expenditure policies. A robustness requirement in the sense of Bergemann and Morris (2005) yields individual incentive compatibility constraints that are equivalent to those in the theory of optimal income taxation in the tradition of Mirrlees (1971). Adding a requirement of coalition-proofness yields a set of collective incentive conditions which are akin those in the literature on public goods provision under private information on preferences, in the tradition of Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973).en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008,39en_US
dc.subject.jelD71en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelH21en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordOptimal Taxationen_US
dc.subject.keywordPublic goods provisionen_US
dc.subject.keywordRevelation of Preferencesen_US
dc.subject.keywordRobust Mechanism Designen_US
dc.subject.stwOptimale Besteuerungen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwOffenbarte Präferenzenen_US
dc.subject.stwMechanismen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleA unified approach to the revelation of public goods preferences and to optimal income taxationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn605758719en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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