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dc.contributor.authorTraxler, Christianen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-03en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T12:02:04Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T12:02:04Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32229-
dc.description.abstractA benchmark result in the political economy of taxation is that majority voting over a linear income tax schedule will result in an inefficiently high tax rate whenever the median voter has a below average income. The present paper examines the role of tax avoidance for this welfare assessment. We find that the inefficiency in the voting equilibrium is the lower, the higher the average level of tax avoidance in the economy, or equivalently, the lower the median voter's amount of avoidance. The result holds for endogenous avoidance and labor choice and, under certain conditions, for an endogenous enforcement policy.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009,22en_US
dc.subject.jelH26en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelD6en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordTax avoidanceen_US
dc.subject.keywordwelfare analysisen_US
dc.subject.keywordmajority votingen_US
dc.subject.keywordmedian voter equilibriumen_US
dc.subject.stwSteuervermeidungen_US
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten_US
dc.subject.stwEinkommensteuertarifen_US
dc.subject.stwEinkommensteuerpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwMedian Voteren_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerwirkungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleMajority voting and the welfare implications of tax avoidanceen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn605805970en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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