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dc.contributor.authorEngel, Christophen_US
dc.contributor.authorHennig-Schmidt, Heikeen_US
dc.contributor.authorIrlenbusch, Bernden_US
dc.contributor.authorKube, Sebastianen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-12-08en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T12:01:59Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T12:01:59Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32218-
dc.description.abstractDoes probation pay a double dividend? Society saves the cost of incarceration, and convicts preserve their liberty. But does probation also reduce the risk of recidivism? In a meta-study we show that the field evidence is inconclusive. Moreover it struggles with an identification problem: those put on probation are less likely to recidivate in the first place. We therefore complement the field evidence by a lab experiment that isolates the definitional feature of probation: the first sanction is conditional on being sanctioned again during the probation period. We find that probationers contribute less to a joint project; punishment cost is higher; efficiency is lower; inequity is higher. While experimental subjects are on probation, they increase their contributions to a joint project. However, once the probation period expires, they reduce their contributions. While in the aggregate these two effects almost cancel out, critically those not punished themselves do trust the institution less if punishment does not become effective immediately.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009,38en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelD03en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.jelK14en_US
dc.subject.jelK42en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordprobationen_US
dc.subject.keywordrecidivismen_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic goodsen_US
dc.subject.keywordpunishmenten_US
dc.subject.keywordexperimental economicsen_US
dc.titleOn probation: an experimental analysisen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn614481589en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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