EconStor >
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn >
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32214
  
Title:On the legitimacy of coercion for the financing of public goods PDF Logo
Authors:Bierbrauer, Felix
Issue Date:2009
Series/Report no.:Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009,15
Abstract:The literature on public goods has shown that efficient outcomes are impossible if participation constraints have to be respected. This paper addresses the question whether they should be imposed. It asks under what conditions efficiency considerations justify that individuals are forced to pay for public goods that they do not value. It is shown that participation constraints are desirable if public goods are provided by a malevolent Leviathan. By contrast, with a Pigouvian planner, efficiency can be achieved. Finally, the paper studies the delegation of public goods provision to a pro t-maximizing rm. This also makes participation constraints desirable.
Subjects:Public goods
Mechanism Design
Incomplete Contracts
Regulation
JEL:D02
D82
H41
L51
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
605799792.pdf628.52 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32214

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.