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dc.contributor.authorGropp, Reinten_US
dc.contributor.authorHakenes, Hendriken_US
dc.contributor.authorSchnabel, Isabelen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-01-27en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T12:01:55Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T12:01:55Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32209-
dc.description.abstractThis paper empirically investigates the effect of government bail-out policies on banks outside the safety net. We construct a measure of bail-out perceptions by using rating information. From there, we construct the market shares of insured competitor banks for any given bank, and analyze the impact of this variable on banks’ risk-taking behavior, using a large sample of banks from OECD countries. Our results suggest that government guarantees strongly increase the risk-taking of competitor banks. In contrast, there is no evidence that public guarantees increase the protected banks' risk-taking, except for banks that have outright public ownership. These results have important implications for the effects of the recent wave of bank bail-outs on banks' risk-taking behavior.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010,05en_US
dc.subject.jelG21en_US
dc.subject.jelG28en_US
dc.subject.jelL53en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordGovernment bail-outen_US
dc.subject.keywordimplicit and explicit government guaranteesen_US
dc.subject.keywordbanking competitionen_US
dc.subject.keywordrisk-takingen_US
dc.titleCompetition, risk-shifting, and public bail-out policiesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn617295093en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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