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Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn >
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32201
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Glöckner, Andreas | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Irlenbusch, Bernd | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Kube, Sebastian | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Nicklisch, Andreas | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Normann, Hans-Theo | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-08-03 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-05-14T12:01:50Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-05-14T12:01:50Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2009 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32201 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | We analyse two team settings in which one member in a team has stronger incentives to contribute than the others. If contributions constitute a sacrifice for the strong player, the other team members are more inclined to cooperate than if contributions are strictly dominant for the strong player. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonn | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009,8 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C91 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C92 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H40 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H41 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Experiments | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Leadership | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Reciprocity | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Voluntary Contribution Mechanism | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Gruppenarbeit | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Öffentliches Gut | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Spieltheorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Führungspersönlichkeit | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Reziprozität | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Test | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Leading with(out) sacrifice? A public-goods experiment with a super-additive player | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 605794790 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
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