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dc.contributor.authorGlöckner, Andreasen_US
dc.contributor.authorIrlenbusch, Bernden_US
dc.contributor.authorKube, Sebastianen_US
dc.contributor.authorNicklisch, Andreasen_US
dc.contributor.authorNormann, Hans-Theoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-03en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T12:01:50Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T12:01:50Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32201-
dc.description.abstractWe analyse two team settings in which one member in a team has stronger incentives to contribute than the others. If contributions constitute a sacrifice for the strong player, the other team members are more inclined to cooperate than if contributions are strictly dominant for the strong player.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009,8en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.jelH40en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordExperimentsen_US
dc.subject.keywordLeadershipen_US
dc.subject.keywordReciprocityen_US
dc.subject.keywordVoluntary Contribution Mechanismen_US
dc.subject.stwGruppenarbeiten_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwFührungspersönlichkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwReziprozitäten_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleLeading with(out) sacrifice? A public-goods experiment with a super-additive playeren_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn605794790en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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