Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32201
Authors: 
Glöckner, Andreas
Irlenbusch, Bernd
Kube, Sebastian
Nicklisch, Andreas
Normann, Hans-Theo
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009,8
Abstract: 
We analyse two team settings in which one member in a team has stronger incentives to contribute than the others. If contributions constitute a sacrifice for the strong player, the other team members are more inclined to cooperate than if contributions are strictly dominant for the strong player.
Subjects: 
Experiments
Leadership
Reciprocity
Voluntary Contribution Mechanism
JEL: 
C91
C92
H40
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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