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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32201
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| Title: | | Leading with(out) sacrifice? A public-goods experiment with a super-additive player  |
| Authors: | | Glöckner, Andreas Irlenbusch, Bernd Kube, Sebastian Nicklisch, Andreas Normann, Hans-Theo |
| Issue Date: | | 2009 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009,8 |
| Abstract: | | We analyse two team settings in which one member in a team has stronger incentives to contribute than the others. If contributions constitute a sacrifice for the strong player, the other team members are more inclined to cooperate than if contributions are strictly dominant for the strong player. |
| Subjects: | | Experiments Leadership Reciprocity Voluntary Contribution Mechanism |
| JEL: | | C91 C92 H40 H41 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
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