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Title:Leading with(out) sacrifice? A public-goods experiment with a super-additive player PDF Logo
Authors:Glöckner, Andreas
Irlenbusch, Bernd
Kube, Sebastian
Nicklisch, Andreas
Normann, Hans-Theo
Issue Date:2009
Series/Report no.:Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009,8
Abstract:We analyse two team settings in which one member in a team has stronger incentives to contribute than the others. If contributions constitute a sacrifice for the strong player, the other team members are more inclined to cooperate than if contributions are strictly dominant for the strong player.
Subjects:Experiments
Leadership
Reciprocity
Voluntary Contribution Mechanism
JEL:C91
C92
H40
H41
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

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