EconStor >
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn >
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32196
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBierbrauer, Felixen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-01-27en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T12:01:48Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T12:01:48Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32196-
dc.description.abstractWe study the provision of an excludable public good to discuss whether the imposition of participation constraints is desirable. It is shown that this question may equivalently be cast as follows: should a firm that produces a public good receive tax revenues, or face a self-financing requirement. The main result is that the desirability of participation constraints is shaped by an equity-efficiency tradeoff: While first-best is out of reach with participation constraints, their imposition yields a more equitable distribution of the surplus. This result relies on an incomplete contracts perspective. With a benevolent mechanism designer, participation constraints are never desirable.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMax Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010,01en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelD86en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.jelL51en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordMechanism Designen_US
dc.subject.keywordIncomplete Contractsen_US
dc.subject.keywordPublic Goodsen_US
dc.subject.keywordRegulationen_US
dc.titleIncomplete contracts and excludable public goodsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn617292698en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
617292698.pdf588.3 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.