Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/32196 
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dc.contributor.authorBierbrauer, Felixen
dc.date.accessioned2010-01-27-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T12:01:48Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T12:01:48Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32196-
dc.description.abstractWe study the provision of an excludable public good to discuss whether the imposition of participation constraints is desirable. It is shown that this question may equivalently be cast as follows: should a firm that produces a public good receive tax revenues, or face a self-financing requirement. The main result is that the desirability of participation constraints is shaped by an equity-efficiency tradeoff: While first-best is out of reach with participation constraints, their imposition yields a more equitable distribution of the surplus. This result relies on an incomplete contracts perspective. With a benevolent mechanism designer, participation constraints are never desirable.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2010,01en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelD86en
dc.subject.jelH41en
dc.subject.jelL51en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordMechanism Designen
dc.subject.keywordIncomplete Contractsen
dc.subject.keywordPublic Goodsen
dc.subject.keywordRegulationen
dc.titleIncomplete contracts and excludable public goods-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn617292698en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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