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Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn >
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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32196
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Bierbrauer, Felix | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-01-27 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-05-14T12:01:48Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-05-14T12:01:48Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2010 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32196 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | We study the provision of an excludable public good to discuss whether the imposition of participation constraints is desirable. It is shown that this question may equivalently be cast as follows: should a firm that produces a public good receive tax revenues, or face a self-financing requirement. The main result is that the desirability of participation constraints is shaped by an equity-efficiency tradeoff: While first-best is out of reach with participation constraints, their imposition yields a more equitable distribution of the surplus. This result relies on an incomplete contracts perspective. With a benevolent mechanism designer, participation constraints are never desirable. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Bonn | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010,01 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D82 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D86 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H41 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | L51 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Mechanism Design | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Incomplete Contracts | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Public Goods | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Regulation | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Incomplete contracts and excludable public goods | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 617292698 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
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