Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/32179 
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dc.contributor.authorSchindler, Dirken
dc.contributor.authorSchjelderup, Guttormen
dc.date.accessioned2006-05-23-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T12:00:42Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T12:00:42Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:bsz:352-opus-18171en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32179-
dc.description.abstractWe study how harmonization of corporate tax systems affects the stability of international cartels. We show that tax base harmonization reinforces collusive agreements, while harmonization of corporate tax rates may destabilize or stabilize cartels. We also find that bilateral and full harmonization to a common standard is worse from society's point of view than unilateral harmonization to a minimum tax standard.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Konstanz, Center of Finance and Econometrics (CoFE) |cKonstanzen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCoFE Discussion Paper |x06/01en
dc.subject.jelH87en
dc.subject.jelL1en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordCorporate tax systemsen
dc.subject.keywordtacit collusionen
dc.subject.stwUnternehmensbesteuerungen
dc.subject.stwSteuerbemessungen
dc.subject.stwSteuerharmonisierungen
dc.subject.stwMultinationales Unternehmenen
dc.subject.stwSteuerwirkungen
dc.subject.stwKartellen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleCompany tax reform in Europe and its effect on collusive behavior-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn512225826en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:cofedp:0601-

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