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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32179
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| Title: | | Company tax reform in Europe and its effect on collusive behavior  |
| Authors: | | Schindler, Dirk Schjelderup, Guttorm |
| Issue Date: | | 2006 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Discussion paper series // Zentrum für Finanzen und Ökonometrie, Universität Konstanz 2006,01 |
| Abstract: | | We study how harmonization of corporate tax systems affects the stability of international cartels. We show that tax base harmonization reinforces collusive agreements, while harmonization of corporate tax rates may destabilize or stabilize cartels. We also find that bilateral and full harmonization to a common standard is worse from society's point of view than unilateral harmonization to a minimum tax standard. |
| Subjects: | | Corporate tax systems tacit collusion |
| JEL: | | H87 L1 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CoFE-Diskussionspapiere, Universität Konstanz
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