Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/32086
Full metadata record
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Helm, Carsten | en |
dc.contributor.author | Neugart, Michael | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2008-12-15 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-05-14T11:57:20Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2010-05-14T11:57:20Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32086 | - |
dc.description.abstract | With ideological parties being better informed about the state of the world than voters, the true motivation of policy proposals is hard to judge for the electorate. However, if reform proposals have to be agreed upon by coalition parties, it may become possible for the government to signal to the voters its private information about the necessity of reforms. Therefore, in coalition governments reforms will be more in line with policy requirements than in single-party governments. This is usually beneficial for the coalition parties as well as for the voter. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aTechnische Universität Darmstadt, Department of Law and Economics |cDarmstadt | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aDarmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics |x192 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D72 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D78 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D82 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Asymmetric information | en |
dc.subject.keyword | coalition governments | en |
dc.subject.keyword | policy reform | en |
dc.subject.stw | Politische Reform | en |
dc.subject.stw | Politische Entscheidung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Regierungskoalition | en |
dc.subject.stw | Asymmetrische Information | en |
dc.subject.stw | Politisches Ziel | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wahlverhalten | en |
dc.title | Coalition governments and policy reform with asymmetric information | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 588004111 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:darddp:dar_35489 | en |
Files in This Item:
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.