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Technische Universität Darmstadt >
Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Technische Universität Darmstadt >
Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics, Inst. f. VWL, TU Darmstadt >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32086
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| Title: | | Coalition governments and policy reform with asymmetric information  |
| Authors: | | Helm, Carsten Neugart, Michael |
| Issue Date: | | 2008 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Darmstadt discussion papers in economics 192 |
| Abstract: | | With ideological parties being better informed about the state of the world than voters, the true motivation of policy proposals is hard to judge for the electorate. However, if reform proposals have to be agreed upon by coalition parties, it may become possible for the government to signal to the voters its private information about the necessity of reforms. Therefore, in coalition governments reforms will be more in line with policy requirements than in single-party governments. This is usually beneficial for the coalition parties as well as for the voter. |
| Subjects: | | Asymmetric information coalition governments policy reform |
| JEL: | | D72 D78 D82 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics, Inst. f. VWL, TU Darmstadt
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