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dc.contributor.authorCarbone, Jared C.en_US
dc.contributor.authorHelm, Carstenen_US
dc.contributor.authorRutherford, Thomas F.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-12-15en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T11:57:05Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T11:57:05Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32083-
dc.description.abstractWe evaluate the efficacy of international trade in carbon emission permits when countries are guided strictly by their national self-interest. To do so, we construct a calibrated general equilibrium model that jointly describes the world economy and the strategic incentives that guide the design of national abatement policies. Countries' decisions about their participation in a trading system and about their initial permit endowment are made noncooperatively; so a priori it is not clear that permit trade will induce participation in international abatement agreements or that participation will result in significant environmental gains. Despite this, we find that emission trade agreements can be effective; that smaller groupings pairing developing and developed-world partners often perform better than agreements with larger rosters; and that general equilibrium responses play an important role in shaping these outcomes.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherTechn. Univ., Inst. für Volkswirtschaftslehre Darmstadten_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDarmstadt discussion papers in economics 194en_US
dc.subject.jelD7en_US
dc.subject.jelF18en_US
dc.subject.jelF42en_US
dc.subject.jelQ58en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordGlobal warmingen_US
dc.subject.keywordcoalitionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordgeneral equilibriumen_US
dc.subject.keywordtradable permitsen_US
dc.subject.stwKlimaveränderungen_US
dc.subject.stwEmissionshandelen_US
dc.subject.stwInternationale Zusammenarbeiten_US
dc.subject.stwAllgemeines Gleichgewichten_US
dc.titleThe case for international emission trade in the absence of cooperative climate policyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn588005126en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics, Inst. f. VWL, TU Darmstadt

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