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Georg-August-Universität Göttingen >
cege - Centrum für Europa-, Governance- und Entwicklungsforschung, Universität Göttingen >
cege-Diskussionspapiere, Universität Göttingen >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32018
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Lambsdorff, Johann | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-08-07 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-05-14T11:54:54Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-05-14T11:54:54Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2001 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32018 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | The objectives of government are pivotal to understanding the diverse negative effects of corruption on public welfare. Corruption renders governments unable or unwilling to maximize welfare. In the first case, it distorts agents decisions and limits the contractual space available to agents and the government, acting as a benevolent principal. In the second case, a corrupt principal creates allocative inefficiencies, cripples its credible commitment to effective policies, and opens the door to opportunism. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Göttingen | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CeGE Discussion Paper 9 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D61 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D72 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | K4 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Corruption | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | welfare | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | principal-agent-theory | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | rent-seeking | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | x-inefficiency | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | kleptocracy | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | opportunism | | en_US |
| dc.title | | How corruption in government affects public welfare: A review of theory | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 500238685 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | cege-Diskussionspapiere, Universität Göttingen
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