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dc.contributor.authorLambsdorff, Johannen_US
dc.contributor.authorNell, Mathiasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2007-02-19en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T11:54:51Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T11:54:51Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32012-
dc.description.abstractCorrupt arrangements are characterized by a high risk of opportunism: double-dealing, whistle-blowing and extortion are significant uncertainties for participants in corrupt transactions. This paper demonstrates how legislators may use an asymmetric design of (criminal) sanctions and leniency programs to amplify these inherent risks, thereby destabilizing corrupt arrangements. It is also shown that asymmetric penalties and (ex-ante) leniency do not necessarily interfere with the goal of deterrence and may be a useful tool to disband the 'pact of silence' characteristic of corrupt arrangements. In particular, we show that bribe-takers should less be penalized for taking and more for reciprocating a bribe. Likewise, bribe-givers should be punished for giving bribes, but not for accepting the bribetakers' reciprocity.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCenter for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Göttingenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCeGE Discussion Paper 59en_US
dc.subject.jelK42en_US
dc.subject.jelD73en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcorruptionen_US
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric penaltiesen_US
dc.subject.keywordleniencyen_US
dc.subject.keyword(self-) reportingen_US
dc.subject.keywordwhistle-blowingen_US
dc.subject.stwKorruptionen_US
dc.subject.stwKriminalpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwKriminalitätsökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwOpportunismusen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleFighting corruption with asymmetric penalties and leniencyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn524498032en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:cegedp:59-
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