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dc.contributor.authorMarchesi, Silviaen_US
dc.contributor.authorSabani, Lauraen_US
dc.contributor.authorDreher, Axelen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-06-30en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T11:54:47Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T11:54:47Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/32001-
dc.description.abstractWe focus on the role that the transmission of information between a multilateral (e.g., the IMF) and a country has for optimal (conditional) reform design. The main result is that the informational advantage of the country must be strictly greater than the advantage of the multilateral in order to increase a country's discretion in the choice of the policies to be implemented (country ownership). To the contrary, an increase in the conflict of interests between the multilateral and the country may lead the multilateral to leave more freedom in designing reforms, which is at odds to what is commonly argued. Our empirical results provide support to the idea that the IMF follows an optimal allocation rule of control rights over policies, leaving the recipient countries more freedom whenever their local knowledge appears to be crucial for designing more adequate reforms.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCenter for European, Governance and Economic Development Research Göttingenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCeGE Discussion Paper 86en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.jelF33en_US
dc.subject.jelN2en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordIMF conditionalityen_US
dc.subject.keyworddelegationen_US
dc.subject.keywordcommunicationen_US
dc.subject.keywordownershipen_US
dc.subject.keywordpanel dataen_US
dc.titleRead my lips: The role of information transmission in multilateral reform designen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn603382665en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:cegedp:86-
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