Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/31986 
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorHaufler, Andreasen
dc.contributor.authorSchjelderup, Guttormen
dc.date.accessioned2009-08-07-
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T11:54:39Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T11:54:39Z-
dc.date.issued1999-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/31986-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we analyze the implications for the national provision of public inputs when pro t shifting is possible, albeit costly, for internationally integrated firms. In this case a high level of public infrastructure will attract real investment, but the rm can at least partly avoid to pay correspondingly high corporate taxes. In contrast to much of the recent literature on capital tax competition and public infrastructure provision we thus nd that public inputs will be unambiguously underprovided when the corporate tax falls only on pure pro ts and international taxation follows the source principle. Extensions of the basic model cover the case of distortive capital taxes and alternative international tax regimes.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Göttingen, Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research (cege) |cGöttingenen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|acege Discussion Papers |x4en
dc.subject.jelH25en
dc.subject.jelH54en
dc.subject.jelH87en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.titleCorporate taxation, profit shifting, and the efficiency of public input provision-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn500237158en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:cegedp:4en

Files in This Item:
File
Size
244.27 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.