|
EconStor >
Georg-August-Universität Göttingen >
cege - Centrum für Europa-, Governance- und Entwicklungsforschung, Universität Göttingen >
cege-Diskussionspapiere, Universität Göttingen >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31981
|
| | |
| Title: | | The political economy of environmental regulations and industry compensation  |
| Authors: | | Stoschek, Barbara |
| Issue Date: | | 2007 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CeGE Discussion Paper 65 |
| Abstract: | | This paper uses a political-economy framework to analyze what consequences the exogenous introduction of a quantitative restriction on total emissions in a small open economy has on the stringency of domestic trade policy. The question is whether and to what extent the government, if it takes different lobby groups´ interests into consideration, has an incentive to compensate the polluting industry for stricter environmental regulations by granting higher protection to it. It turns out that the government will indeed tend to increase subsidization of the industry affected by environmental regulation. This compensation will even be more than complete as long as environmental interests are taken into account. Hence, contrary to what might be expected, a net benefit for the polluting sector arises from environmental restrictions. |
| Subjects: | | environmental regulations international competitiveness political |
| JEL: | | F18 Q52 Q58 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | cege-Diskussionspapiere, Universität Göttingen
|
| Files in This Item:
| |
|
| No. of Downloads:
| |
| last Month |
last 3 Month |
total |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31981
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|