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dc.contributor.authorGubaydullina, Zuliaen_US
dc.contributor.authorBizer, Kilianen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-04-28en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T11:53:48Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T11:53:48Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/31958-
dc.description.abstractThe paper aims at defining the role of intentions for reciprocity. The ultimatum game is modified, by adding a kind of randomizer (Chinese Whisper”), to generate outcomes which are not intended und thus to separate the proposers’ initial intentions from their actual offers. The mechanism ensures that the responder reacts to changing intentions and not to changing outcomes. This experimental approach also has the advantage that the number of available options for the proposer is not limited. Our evidence supports the view that fairness theory should explicitly address intentions responders exhibit different acceptance rates depending on the intentions of proposers.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv., Volkswirtschaftliches Seminar Göttingenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiskussionsbeiträge aus dem Volkswirtschaftlichen Seminar der Universität Göttingen 135en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordFairnessen_US
dc.subject.keywordReciprocityen_US
dc.subject.keywordIntentionen_US
dc.subject.keywordUltimatum gameen_US
dc.titleTracing fairness intentions: Chinese whisperen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn598706259en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Diskussionsbeiträge aus dem Volkswirtschaftlichen Seminar, Universität Göttingen

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