Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31940
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dc.contributor.authorFahrholz, Christianen_US
dc.contributor.authorMohl, Philippen_US
dc.date.accessioned2005-03-03en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T11:52:50Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T11:52:50Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/31940-
dc.description.abstractThe monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) is the subject matter of this paper. We analyze the prospects for future price stability in an enlarged European Monetary and Economic Union (EMU). At the heart of this study are the potential effects of altering decision-making procedure within the Governing Council of the ECB on price stability in the eurozone. The authors compare the impact of three alternative reform scenarios of the ECB Governing Council with the help of a voting-power analysis. It is presumed that a considerable loss of current EMU-members' influence power especially in favour of joining Central Eastern European Countries (CEECs) results in a loss of monetary credibility of the ECB: As transparency of the decision-making process within the ECB is lacking, markets may consider the ECB to be too much inclined to the economic performances of the CEECs. This has then a negative impact on the level of price stability in Europe. The voting-power analysis indicates which reform proposal is best with respect to a price-stability benchmark.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aJean Monnet Centre of Excellence |cBerlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aEzoneplus working paper / Eastward Enlargement of the Eurozone |x23en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelD78en_US
dc.subject.jelE58en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordpower indicesen_US
dc.subject.keywordBanzhafen_US
dc.subject.keywordECBen_US
dc.subject.keywordmonetary policyen_US
dc.subject.keywordenlargementen_US
dc.subject.keywordeurozoneen_US
dc.titleEMU-enlargement and the reshaping of decision-making within the ECB Governing Council: a voting-power analysisen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn480767211en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-

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