Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31912
Authors: 
Gaggermeier, Christian
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
IAB discussion paper 2006,3
Abstract: 
In an overlapping-generations model with endogenous birth rates, I design a reform of the pay-as-you-go pension system, which internalises positive externalities of children - their pension contributions. Individuals may differ in their preferences for children and their ability to have children at all. They can choose between the status-quo flat-rate benefits and a new system, in which they get just the benefits that are (on average) financed by their own children, reduced by an amount which is used to subsidise the flat-rate system. Whereas people with low child preferences keep the status quo, people with high child preferences choose the individualised system, having the optimal incentives to raise children and a higher utility.
Subjects: 
Rentenreform - Modell
Rentenhöhe
Rentenanpassung
Rentenunterschied
Rentenversicherung
Eltern
Rentner
Kinderlosigkeit
Kinderzahl
Rente - Finanzierung
Versorgungsausgleich
Lebensstandard
Generationenvertrag
Familienpolitik
demografische Faktoren
Rentenpolitik
JEL: 
H55
J11
J13
J26
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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