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dc.contributor.authorHugh-Jones, Daviden_US
dc.contributor.authorReinstein, Daviden_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-07-21en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T11:14:00Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T11:14:00Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/31757-
dc.description.abstractCostly signaling of commitment to a group has been proposed as an explanation for participation in religion and ritual. But if the signal’s cost is too small, freeriders will send the signal and behave selfishly later. Effective signaling may then be prohibitively costly. If the average level of signaling in a group is observable, but individual effort is not, then freeriders can behave selfishly without being detected, and group members will learn about the average level of commitment among the group. We develop a formal model, and give examples of institutions that enable anonymous signaling, including ritual, religion, music and dance, voting, charitable donations, and military institutions. We explore the value of anonymity in the laboratory with a repeated two-stage public goods game with exclusion. When first-stage contributions are anonymous, subjects are better at predicting second-stage behavior, and maintain a substantially higher level of cooperation.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniversität Jena und Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik Jenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesJena economic research papers 2009,048en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordsignalingen_US
dc.subject.keywordanonymityen_US
dc.subject.keywordpublic goodsen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwWiederholte Spieleen_US
dc.subject.stwTrittbrettfahrerverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwSignallingen_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Gruppeen_US
dc.subject.stwKooperationen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleSecret santa: anonymity, signaling, and conditional cooperationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn605058083en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik

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