Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31733
Authors: 
Güth, Werner
Levati, Maria Vittoria
Ploner, Matteo
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Jena economic research papers 2008,078
Abstract: 
The satisficing approach is generalized and applied to finite n-person games. Based on direct elicitation of aspirations, we formally define the concept of satisficing, which does not exclude (prior-free) optimality but includes it as a border case. We also review some experiments on strategic games illustrating and partly supporting our theoretical approach.
Subjects: 
Strategic interaction
satisficing behavior
bounded rationality
JEL: 
C72
C92
D01
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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