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Title:Satisficing in strategic environments: a theoretical approach and experimental evidence PDF Logo
Authors:Güth, Werner
Levati, Maria Vittoria
Ploner, Matteo
Issue Date:2008
Series/Report no.:Jena economic research papers 2008,078
Abstract:The satisficing approach is generalized and applied to finite n-person games. Based on direct elicitation of aspirations, we formally define the concept of satisficing, which does not exclude (prior-free) optimality but includes it as a border case. We also review some experiments on strategic games illustrating and partly supporting our theoretical approach.
Subjects:Strategic interaction
satisficing behavior
bounded rationality
JEL:C72
C92
D01
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik

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