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dc.contributor.authorKirchkamp , Oliveren_US
dc.contributor.authorReiss, J. Philippen_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-10-29en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T11:12:45Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T11:12:45Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/31716-
dc.description.abstractWe present results from a series of experiments that allow us to measure overbidding and, in particular, underbidding in first-price auctions. We investigate how the amount of underbidding depends on seemingly innocent parameters of the experimental setup. To structure our data we present and test a theory of constant markdown bids. While a fraction of bidders can be well described by Bayesian Nash equilibrium bids, a larger fraction seems to either use constant markdown bids or seems to rationally optimise against a population where some members use markdown bids and some are rational.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniversität Jena und Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik Jenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesJena economic research papers 2008,066en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.jelD44en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordAuctionen_US
dc.subject.keywordexperimenten_US
dc.subject.keywordoverbiddingen_US
dc.subject.keywordunderbiddingen_US
dc.subject.keywordrisk-aversion.en_US
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwRisikoaversionen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleHeterogeneous bids in auctions with rational and markdown bidderstheory and experimenten_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn583849091en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik

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