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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31716
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| Title: | | Heterogeneous bids in auctions with rational and markdown bidderstheory and experiment  |
| Authors: | | Kirchkamp , Oliver Reiss, J. Philipp |
| Issue Date: | | 2008 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Jena economic research papers 2008,066 |
| Abstract: | | We present results from a series of experiments that allow us to measure overbidding and, in particular, underbidding in first-price auctions. We investigate how the amount of underbidding depends on seemingly innocent parameters of the experimental setup. To structure our data we present and test a theory of constant markdown bids. While a fraction of bidders can be well described by Bayesian Nash equilibrium bids, a larger fraction seems to either use constant markdown bids or seems to rationally optimise against a population where some members use markdown bids and some are rational. |
| Subjects: | | Auction experiment overbidding underbidding risk-aversion. |
| JEL: | | C92 D44 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik
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