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Title:Voluntary cooperation based on equilibrium retribution: an experiment testing finite-horizon folk theorems PDF Logo
Authors:Bruttel, Lisa V.
Güth, Werner
Kamecke, Ulrich
Popova, Vera
Issue Date:2009
Series/Report no.:Jena economic research papers 2009,030
Abstract:Unlike previous attempts to implement cooperation in a prisoners' dilemma game with an infinite horizon in the laboratory, we focus on extended prisoners' dilemma games in which a second (pure strategy) equilibrium allows for voluntary cooperation in all but the last round. Our four main experimental treatments distinguish long versus short horizon and strict versus non-strict additional equilibrium compared to the control treatment, a standard prisoners' dilemma. Quite surprisingly, according to our results, only a strict additional equilibrium increases cooperation rate for a given time horizon. As expected a longer time horizon promotes cooperation.
Subjects:Folk theorem
Finite horizon
Prisoners' dilemma
Experiment
JEL:C73
C91
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik

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