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dc.contributor.authorBruttel, Lisa V.en_US
dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werneren_US
dc.contributor.authorKamecke, Ulrichen_US
dc.contributor.authorPopova, Veraen_US
dc.date.accessioned2009-04-28en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T11:12:44Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T11:12:44Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/31715-
dc.description.abstractUnlike previous attempts to implement cooperation in a prisoners' dilemma game with an infinite horizon in the laboratory, we focus on extended prisoners' dilemma games in which a second (pure strategy) equilibrium allows for voluntary cooperation in all but the last round. Our four main experimental treatments distinguish long versus short horizon and strict versus non-strict additional equilibrium compared to the control treatment, a standard prisoners' dilemma. Quite surprisingly, according to our results, only a strict additional equilibrium increases cooperation rate for a given time horizon. As expected a longer time horizon promotes cooperation.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniversität Jena und Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik Jenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesJena economic research papers 2009,030en_US
dc.subject.jelC73en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordFolk theoremen_US
dc.subject.keywordFinite horizonen_US
dc.subject.keywordPrisoners' dilemmaen_US
dc.subject.keywordExperimenten_US
dc.subject.stwGefangenendilemmaen_US
dc.subject.stwKooperationen_US
dc.subject.stwExtensives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwFolk-Theoremen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleVoluntary cooperation based on equilibrium retribution: an experiment testing finite-horizon folk theoremsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn598703527en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik

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