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Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Jena >
Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31715
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Bruttel, Lisa V. | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Güth, Werner | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Kamecke, Ulrich | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Popova, Vera | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2009-04-28 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-05-14T11:12:44Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-05-14T11:12:44Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2009 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31715 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | Unlike previous attempts to implement cooperation in a prisoners' dilemma game with an infinite horizon in the laboratory, we focus on extended prisoners' dilemma games in which a second (pure strategy) equilibrium allows for voluntary cooperation in all but the last round. Our four main experimental treatments distinguish long versus short horizon and strict versus non-strict additional equilibrium compared to the control treatment, a standard prisoners' dilemma. Quite surprisingly, according to our results, only a strict additional equilibrium increases cooperation rate for a given time horizon. As expected a longer time horizon promotes cooperation. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Universität Jena und Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik Jena | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Jena economic research papers 2009,030 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C73 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C91 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Folk theorem | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Finite horizon | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Prisoners' dilemma | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Experiment | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Gefangenendilemma | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Kooperation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Extensives Spiel | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Folk-Theorem | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Test | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Voluntary cooperation based on equilibrium retribution: an experiment testing finite-horizon folk theorems | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 598703527 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik
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