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| Title: | | Voluntary cooperation based on equilibrium retribution: an experiment testing finite-horizon folk theorems  |
| Authors: | | Bruttel, Lisa V. Güth, Werner Kamecke, Ulrich Popova, Vera |
| Issue Date: | | 2009 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Jena economic research papers 2009,030 |
| Abstract: | | Unlike previous attempts to implement cooperation in a prisoners' dilemma game with an infinite horizon in the laboratory, we focus on extended prisoners' dilemma games in which a second (pure strategy) equilibrium allows for voluntary cooperation in all but the last round. Our four main experimental treatments distinguish long versus short horizon and strict versus non-strict additional equilibrium compared to the control treatment, a standard prisoners' dilemma. Quite surprisingly, according to our results, only a strict additional equilibrium increases cooperation rate for a given time horizon. As expected a longer time horizon promotes cooperation. |
| Subjects: | | Folk theorem Finite horizon Prisoners' dilemma Experiment |
| JEL: | | C73 C91 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik
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