Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31715
Authors: 
Bruttel, Lisa V.
Güth, Werner
Kamecke, Ulrich
Popova, Vera
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Jena economic research papers 2009,030
Abstract: 
Unlike previous attempts to implement cooperation in a prisoners' dilemma game with an infinite horizon in the laboratory, we focus on extended prisoners' dilemma games in which a second (pure strategy) equilibrium allows for voluntary cooperation in all but the last round. Our four main experimental treatments distinguish long versus short horizon and strict versus non-strict additional equilibrium compared to the control treatment, a standard prisoners' dilemma. Quite surprisingly, according to our results, only a strict additional equilibrium increases cooperation rate for a given time horizon. As expected a longer time horizon promotes cooperation.
Subjects: 
Folk theorem
Finite horizon
Prisoners' dilemma
Experiment
JEL: 
C73
C91
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
483.56 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.