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Title:Cycles of conditional cooperation in a real-time voluntary contribution mechanism PDF Logo
Authors:Levati, Maria Vittoria
Zultan, Ro'i
Issue Date:2009
Series/Report no.:Jena economic research papers 2009,029
Abstract:This paper provides a new way to identify conditional cooperation in a real-time version of the standard voluntary contribution mechanism. Our approach avoids most drawbacks of the traditional procedures because it relies on endogenous cycle lengths, which are defined by the number of contributors a player waits before committing to a further contribution. Based on hypothetical distributions of randomly generated contribution sequences, we provide strong evidence for conditionally cooperative behavior. Moreover, notwithstanding a decline in contributions, conditional cooperation is found to be stable over time.
Subjects:Public goods game
Real-time protocol
Information feedback
Conditional cooperation
Simulations
JEL:C72
C92
H41
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik

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