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dc.contributor.authorWray, L. Randallen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T11:08:47Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T11:08:47Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/31564-
dc.description.abstractThis paper addresses three issues surrounding monetary policy formation: policy independence, choice of operating targets, and rules versus discretion. According to the New Monetary Consensus, the central bank needs policy independence to build credibility; the operating target is the overnight interbank lending rate, and the ultimate goal is price stability. This paper provides an alternative view, arguing that an effective central bank cannot be independent as conventionally defined, where effectiveness is indicated by ability to hit an overnight nominal interest rate target. Discretionary policy is rejected, as are conventional views of the central bank’s ability to achieve traditional goals such as robust growth, low inflation, and high employment. Thus, the paper returns to Keynes’s call for low interest rates and euthanasia of the rentier.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherThe Levy Economics Inst. of Bard College Annandale-on-Hudson, NYen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking papers // The Levy Economics Institute 510en_US
dc.subject.jelE12en_US
dc.subject.jelE31en_US
dc.subject.jelE43en_US
dc.subject.jelE52en_US
dc.subject.jelE61en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordCentral Bank Independenceen_US
dc.subject.keywordInterest Rate Determinationen_US
dc.subject.keywordReal versus Nominal Ratesen_US
dc.subject.keywordInterest Rate Targetsen_US
dc.subject.keywordRules versus Discretionen_US
dc.titleA post-Keynesian view of central bank independence, policy targets, and the rules-versus-discretion debateen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn571698786en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
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