|
EconStor >
Bard College, Annandale-on-Hudson (NY) >
Levy Economics Institute of Bard College >
Working Papers, Levy Economics Institute of Bard College >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31545
|
| | |
| Title: | | Background considerations to a regulation of the US financial system: third time a charm? Or strike three?  |
| Authors: | | Kregel, Jan |
| Issue Date: | | 2009 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Working papers // The Levy Economics Institute 557 |
| Abstract: | | U.S. financial regulation has traditionally made functional and institutional regulation roughly equivalent. However, the gradual shift away from Glass-Steagall and the introduction of the Financial Modernization Act (FMA) generated a disorderly mix of functions and products across institutions, creating regulatory gaps that contributed to the recent crisis. An analysis of this history suggests that a return to regulation by function or product would strengthen regulation. The FMA also made a choice in favor of financial holding companies over universal banks, but without recognizing that both types of structure require specific regulatory regimes. The paper reviews the specific regime that has been used by Germany in regulating its universal banks and suggests that a similar regime adapted to holding companies should be developed. |
| Subjects: | | Financial reregulation Glass-Steagall Financial Modernization Act German universal bank regulation prudential regulation |
| JEL: | | G21 G28 F33 F36 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Working Papers, Levy Economics Institute of Bard College
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31545
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|