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dc.contributor.authorBrown, William O.en_US
dc.contributor.authorHelland, Ericen_US
dc.contributor.authorSmith, Janet Kiholmen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T11:06:23Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T11:06:23Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/31432-
dc.description.abstractWe study corporate philanthropy using an original database that includes firm-level data on dollar giving, giving priorities, governance, and managerial involvement in giving programs. Results provide some support for the theory that giving enhances shareholder value, as firms in the same industry tend to adopt similar giving practices and firms that advertise more intensively also give more to charity. But much of our evidence indicates that agency costs play a prominent role in explaining corporate giving. Firms with larger boards of directors are associated with significantly more cash giving and with the establishment of corporate foundations. Consistent with effective monitoring by creditors, firms with higher debt-to-value ratios give less cash to charities and are less likely to establish foundations. The empirical work considers the impact of industry regulation on giving and controls for state philanthropy laws and fiduciary responsibility laws.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherClaremont Inst. for Economic Policy Studies Claremont, Calif.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking paper series // Claremont Institute for Economic Policy Studies 2006-01en_US
dc.subject.jelG34en_US
dc.subject.jelG38en_US
dc.subject.jelK22en_US
dc.subject.jelL51en_US
dc.subject.jelM41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordCorporate philanthropy : corporate governanceen_US
dc.subject.keywordboards of directorsen_US
dc.subject.keywordmonitoring, agency costsen_US
dc.subject.stwWohltätigkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwUnternehmensethiken_US
dc.subject.stwCorporate Governanceen_US
dc.subject.stwVorstanden_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungskontrolleen_US
dc.subject.stwUSAen_US
dc.titleCorporate philanthropic practicesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn50865033Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Claremont Colleges Working Papers in Economics, Department of Economics, Claremont McKenna College

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