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Claremont Colleges Working Papers in Economics, Department of Economics, Claremont McKenna College >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31429
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Chami, Ralph | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Hess, Gregory D. | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.editor | | Claremont Institute for Economic Policy Studies | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-05-14T11:06:21Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-05-14T11:06:21Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2002 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31429 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | Why do some U.S. states have higher levels of marital formation than others? This paper introduces an economic model wherein a state's representative individual may choose to marry in order to diversity his or her idiosyncratic income risk. The paper demonstrates that such a diversification motive is enhanced for some utility functions when a state's level of undiversifiable risk becomes larger, and when a state's initial income and growth rate is lower. A test of the model's predictious, using cross - sectional data for the 50 U.S. states, suggests that there is broad support for a risk sharing motive for marriage as well as for a precautionary attitude towards risk. - Consumption Insurance ; Marriage | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Claremont Inst. for Economic Policy Studies Claremont, Calif. | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Working paper series // Claremont Institute for Economic Policy Studies 2002-07 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | J12 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D1 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | E21 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Regionale Disparität | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Familienökonomik | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Verdienstausfall | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Risiko | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Versicherung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Schätzung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | USA | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Eherecht | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Ehe | | en_US |
| dc.title | | For better or for worse? State-level marital formation and risk sharing | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 366234595 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | Claremont Colleges Working Papers in Economics, Department of Economics, Claremont McKenna College
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