EconStor >
Claremont McKenna College >
Department of Economics, Claremont McKenna College >
Claremont Colleges Working Papers in Economics, Department of Economics, Claremont McKenna College >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31429
  
Title:For better or for worse? State-level marital formation and risk sharing PDF Logo
Authors:Chami, Ralph
Hess, Gregory D.
Editors:Claremont Institute for Economic Policy Studies
Issue Date:2002
Series/Report no.:Working paper series // Claremont Institute for Economic Policy Studies 2002-07
Abstract:Why do some U.S. states have higher levels of marital formation than others? This paper introduces an economic model wherein a state's representative individual may choose to marry in order to diversity his or her idiosyncratic income risk. The paper demonstrates that such a diversification motive is enhanced for some utility functions when a state's level of undiversifiable risk becomes larger, and when a state's initial income and growth rate is lower. A test of the model's predictious, using cross - sectional data for the 50 U.S. states, suggests that there is broad support for a risk sharing motive for marriage as well as for a precautionary attitude towards risk. - Consumption Insurance ; Marriage
JEL:J12
D1
E21
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Claremont Colleges Working Papers in Economics, Department of Economics, Claremont McKenna College

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
366234595.pdf361.77 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31429

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.