EconStor >
University of California (UC) >
UC Davis, Department of Economics >
Working Papers, Department of Economics, UC Davis >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31342
  
Title:Milton Friedman's stance: the methodology of causal realism PDF Logo
Authors:Hoover, Kevin D.
Issue Date:2004
Series/Report no.:Working papers // University of California, Department of Economics 06,6
Abstract:Milton Friedman is usually regarded as an instrumentalist on the basis of his infamous claim that economic theories are to be judged by their predictions and not by the realism of their assumptions. This interpretation sits oddly with Friedman’s empirical work – e.g., Friedman and Schwartz’s monetary history – and his explicit rejection of theories of the business cycle that, while based on accurate correlations, nevertheless do not make economic sense. In this paper, I try to reconcile Friedman’s methodological writings with his practices as an empirical economist by, first, taking his roots in Alfred Marshall seriously and, second, by taking the methodological implications of his empirical work seriously. Friedman dislikes the word “cause”. Nevertheless, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, Friedman is best understood as a causal realist – that is, one who understands the object of scientific inquiry as the discovery through empirical investigation of the true causal mechanisms underlying observable phenomena.
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Department of Economics, UC Davis

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
508644186.pdf157.95 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31342

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.