Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/31338 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 05-36
Verlag: 
University of California, Department of Economics, Davis, CA
Zusammenfassung: 
We present a non-technical account of ambiguity in strategic games and show how it may be applied to economics and social sciences. Optimistic and pessimistic responses to ambiguity are formally modelled. We show that pessimism has the effect of increasing (decreasing) equilibrium prices under Cournot (Bertrand) competition. In addition the effects of ambiguity on peace-making are examined. It is shown that ambiguity may select equilibria in coordination games with multiple equilibria. Some comparative statics results are derived for the impact of ambiguity in games with strategic complements.
JEL: 
C72
D43
D62
D81
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
466.88 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.