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|Title:||Ambiguity and social interaction |
Kelsey, David H.
Schipper, Burkhard C.
|Issue Date:||2005 |
|Series/Report no.:||Working papers // University of California, Department of Economics 05,36|
|Abstract:||We present a non-technical account of ambiguity in strategic games and show how it may be applied to economics and social sciences. Optimistic and pessimistic responses to ambiguity are formally modelled. We show that pessimism has the effect of increasing (decreasing) equilibrium prices under Cournot (Bertrand) competition. In addition the effects of ambiguity on peace-making are examined. It is shown that ambiguity may select equilibria in coordination games with multiple equilibria. Some comparative statics results are derived for the impact of ambiguity in games with strategic complements.|
|Document Type:||Working Paper|
|Appears in Collections:||Working Papers, Department of Economics, UC Davis|
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