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Working Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers University >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31298
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Neyman, Abraham | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Okada, Daijiro | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2006-03-08 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-05-14T11:02:16Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2010-05-14T11:02:16Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2005 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31298 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | This paper initiates the study of long term interactions where players' bounded rationality varies over time. Time dependent bounded rationality is reflected in part in the number $\psi(t)$ of distinct strategies in the first $t$-stages. We examine how the growth rate of $\psi_i(t)$ affects equilibrium outcomes of repeated games, and, as a special case, we study the repeated games with nonstationary bounded recall. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Dep. of Economics, Rutgers, the State Univ. of New Jersey New Brunswick, NJ | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Working papers // Department of Economics, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey 2005,14 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C72 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C73 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Bounded Rationality | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Strategy Set Growth | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Strategic Complexity | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Nonstationary Bounded Recall | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Repeated Games | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Entropy | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Soziale Beziehungen | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Beschränkte Rationalität | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Zeit | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Wiederholte Spiele | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Entropie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Growth of strategy sets, entropy and nonstationary bounded recall | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 508623774 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | Working Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers University
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