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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31298
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| Title: | | Growth of strategy sets, entropy and nonstationary bounded recall  |
| Authors: | | Neyman, Abraham Okada, Daijiro |
| Issue Date: | | 2005 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Working papers // Department of Economics, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey 2005,14 |
| Abstract: | | This paper initiates the study of long term interactions where players' bounded rationality varies over time. Time dependent bounded rationality is reflected in part in the number $\psi(t)$ of distinct strategies in the first $t$-stages. We examine how the growth rate of $\psi_i(t)$ affects equilibrium outcomes of repeated games, and, as a special case, we study the repeated games with nonstationary bounded recall. |
| Subjects: | | Bounded Rationality Strategy Set Growth Strategic Complexity Nonstationary Bounded Recall Repeated Games Entropy |
| JEL: | | C72 C73 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Working Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers University
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