Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31298
 Title: Growth of strategy sets, entropy and nonstationary bounded recall Authors: Neyman, AbrahamOkada, Daijiro Issue Date: 2005 Series/Report no.: Working papers // Department of Economics, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey 2005,14 Abstract: This paper initiates the study of long term interactions where players' bounded rationality varies over time. Time dependent bounded rationality is reflected in part in the number $\psi(t)$ of distinct strategies in the first $t$-stages. We examine how the growth rate of $\psi_i(t)$ affects equilibrium outcomes of repeated games, and, as a special case, we study the repeated games with nonstationary bounded recall. Subjects: Bounded RationalityStrategy Set GrowthStrategic ComplexityNonstationary Bounded RecallRepeated GamesEntropy JEL: C72C73 Document Type: Working Paper Appears in Collections: Working Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers University

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