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Title:Growth of strategy sets, entropy and nonstationary bounded recall PDF Logo
Authors:Neyman, Abraham
Okada, Daijiro
Issue Date:2005
Series/Report no.:Working papers // Department of Economics, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey 2005,14
Abstract:This paper initiates the study of long term interactions where players' bounded rationality varies over time. Time dependent bounded rationality is reflected in part in the number $\psi(t)$ of distinct strategies in the first $t$-stages. We examine how the growth rate of $\psi_i(t)$ affects equilibrium outcomes of repeated games, and, as a special case, we study the repeated games with nonstationary bounded recall.
Subjects:Bounded Rationality
Strategy Set Growth
Strategic Complexity
Nonstationary Bounded Recall
Repeated Games
Entropy
JEL:C72
C73
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers University

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