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|Title:||Decentralizing aid with interested parties |
|Authors:||Epstein, Gil S.|
Gang, Ira N.
|Issue Date:||2006 |
|Series/Report no.:||Working papers // Department of Economics, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey 2006,29|
|Abstract:||This paper analyzes the decentralization of decision-making in aid-giving in a theoretical rent-seeking framework. In this analysis the root donor establishes a necessary criterion for potential recipients: good governance. The potential recipients compete in hierarchal contests for funds. The paper investigates whether, under certain reasonable conditions, fashionable aid procedures will lead to the development of a poverty trap.|
|Document Type:||Working Paper|
|Appears in Collections:||Working Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers University|
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