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Title:Decentralizing aid with interested parties PDF Logo
Authors:Epstein, Gil S.
Gang, Ira N.
Issue Date:2006
Series/Report no.:Working papers // Department of Economics, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey 2006,29
Abstract:This paper analyzes the decentralization of decision-making in aid-giving in a theoretical rent-seeking framework. In this analysis the root donor establishes a necessary criterion for potential recipients: good governance. The potential recipients compete in hierarchal contests for funds. The paper investigates whether, under certain reasonable conditions, fashionable aid procedures will lead to the development of a poverty trap.
Subjects:Foreign aid
rent seeking
governance
decentralization
JEL:O10
O19
F35
O11
C23
O47
E21
E22
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers University

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