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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31263
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| Title: | | Decentralizing aid with interested parties  |
| Authors: | | Epstein, Gil S. Gang, Ira N. |
| Issue Date: | | 2006 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Working papers // Department of Economics, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey 2006,29 |
| Abstract: | | This paper analyzes the decentralization of decision-making in aid-giving in a theoretical rent-seeking framework. In this analysis the root donor establishes a necessary criterion for potential recipients: good governance. The potential recipients compete in hierarchal contests for funds. The paper investigates whether, under certain reasonable conditions, fashionable aid procedures will lead to the development of a poverty trap. |
| Subjects: | | Foreign aid rent seeking governance decentralization |
| JEL: | | O10 O19 F35 O11 C23 O47 E21 E22 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Working Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers University
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