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Discussion Papers, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31254
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| Title: | | Vote buying I: legislatures and lobbying  |
| Authors: | | Dekel, Eddie Jackson, Matthew O. Wolinsky, Asher |
| Issue Date: | | 2006 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Discussion paper // Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1434 |
| Abstract: | | We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were al-lowed and free of stigma. Two parties compete in a binary election and may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via up-front binding payments and/or campaign promises (platforms) that are contingent upon the outcome of the elec-tion. We analyze the role of the parties.and voters.preferences in determining the winner and the payments to voters. |
| Subjects: | | vote buying political economy campaign promises |
| JEL: | | P16 C72 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Discussion Papers, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University
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