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Title:Vote buying I: legislatures and lobbying PDF Logo
Authors:Dekel, Eddie
Jackson, Matthew O.
Wolinsky, Asher
Issue Date:2006
Series/Report no.:Discussion paper // Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1434
Abstract:We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were al-lowed and free of stigma. Two parties compete in a binary election and may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via up-front binding payments and/or campaign promises (platforms) that are contingent upon the outcome of the elec-tion. We analyze the role of the parties.and voters.preferences in determining the winner and the payments to voters.
Subjects:vote buying
political economy
campaign promises
JEL:P16
C72
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Discussion Papers, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University

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