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Title:Vote buying II: legislatures and lobbying PDF Logo
Authors:Dekel, Eddie
Jackson, Matthew O.
Wolinsky, Asher
Issue Date:2006
Series/Report no.:Discussion paper // Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1433
Abstract:We examine the consequences of lobbying and vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two .lobbyists. compete for the votes of legislators by o├żering up-front payments to the legislators in exchange for their votes. We analyze how the lobbyists.budget constraints and legislator preferences determine the winner and the payments.
Subjects:vote buying
lobbying
legislatures
political economy
JEL:P16
C72
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Discussion Papers, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University

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