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dc.contributor.authorDekel, Eddieen_US
dc.contributor.authorJackson, Matthew O.en_US
dc.contributor.authorWolinsky, Asheren_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-05-14T10:19:20Z-
dc.date.available2010-05-14T10:19:20Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/31252-
dc.description.abstractWe examine the consequences of lobbying and vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two .lobbyists. compete for the votes of legislators by oþering up-front payments to the legislators in exchange for their votes. We analyze how the lobbyists.budget constraints and legislator preferences determine the winner and the payments.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherNorthwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science Evanstonen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paper // Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1433en_US
dc.subject.jelP16en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordvote buyingen_US
dc.subject.keywordlobbyingen_US
dc.subject.keywordlegislaturesen_US
dc.subject.keywordpolitical economyen_US
dc.subject.stwÖkonomische Theorie der Demokratieen_US
dc.subject.stwPolitische Parteien_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwWahlen_US
dc.subject.stwWahlverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleVote buying II: legislatures and lobbyingen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn587536950en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
Appears in Collections:Discussion Papers, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University

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