Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31252
Authors: 
Dekel, Eddie
Jackson, Matthew O.
Wolinsky, Asher
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper // Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1433
Abstract: 
We examine the consequences of lobbying and vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two .lobbyists. compete for the votes of legislators by o├żering up-front payments to the legislators in exchange for their votes. We analyze how the lobbyists.budget constraints and legislator preferences determine the winner and the payments.
Subjects: 
vote buying
lobbying
legislatures
political economy
JEL: 
P16
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
250.23 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.