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Discussion Papers, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/31252
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| Title: | | Vote buying II: legislatures and lobbying  |
| Authors: | | Dekel, Eddie Jackson, Matthew O. Wolinsky, Asher |
| Issue Date: | | 2006 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Discussion paper // Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1433 |
| Abstract: | | We examine the consequences of lobbying and vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two .lobbyists. compete for the votes of legislators by oþering up-front payments to the legislators in exchange for their votes. We analyze how the lobbyists.budget constraints and legislator preferences determine the winner and the payments. |
| Subjects: | | vote buying lobbying legislatures political economy |
| JEL: | | P16 C72 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Discussion Papers, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University
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